Baloch insurgency is one of the oldest internal conflicts in Pakistan. The movement was based on a feeling of political and economic marginalization, later hijacked by anit-State elements who turned it into a mechanised terrorist organisation. The Baloch nationalists have over the years been demanding more autonomy, possession of natural resources, and even outright independence.
Balochistan is a mineral-rich and natural gas-rich region, but the local communities believe that they have not gained out of the natural resources. All these complaints have resulted in recurrent rebellions, with significant revolts taking place in 1948, 1958, 1962, 1973, 1977, also during the early 2000s, and now once again resurged since 2023-2024.
Gradually, several militant organizations have come up which have employed the use of armed violence in the promotion of their political agenda and to destabalise Pakistan. The insurgency and terrorist efforts are led by Fitna-al-Hindustan (FAH) and its various proxies i.e., BLA, BYC, and BLF.
Whereas in the previous stages of the insurgency, the main targets were military bases, gas pipelines, and governmental buildings, recent years have witnessed a dramatic change. The FAH militants’ networks have also widened their target to non-Baloch civilians, primarily Punjabis and Sindhis working or living in Balochistan and foreign nationals, particularly Chinese workers linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
This threatening turn is evidenced by the 2018 attack on the Chinese Consulate in Karachi, the 2021 Dasu bus attack that killed nine Chinese engineers, and a series of attacks in Gwadar and Turbat.
Source: BBC
This strategic shift implies that so-called “separatist organizations,” undercover India-proxy terrorist organisations, such as FAH, were never concerned with the rights of the marginalised Balochis. Rather from day one, their agenda was to sabotage the regional and economic connections of Pakistan by attacking foreigners, whom they distortedly regard as occupiers or collaborators. Such a transformation heralds a more violent and sophisticated period in the insurgency, and with grave consequences to national and regional security.
Actors and Ideologies: The Rise of Militant Groups
Fitna-al-Hindustan (FAH) and their proxy militant organizations, are the most notable anti-state actors responsible for Baloch insurgency today. The most active and organized of them, the FAH has claimed credit for several high-profile attacks, such as the attacks on Chinese targets and the Pakistani security forces. Although these groups claim to be independent of each other, nevertheless, they are united in their ideology, which is to:
- Destabalise Pakistan. Create Social Disintegration, instil Fear and Unrest.
- Target any individual or group not aligned with their anti-State agenda.
- Persecute the non-Balochis and Chinese nationals in Balochistan.
Initially, their conflict was characterized by nationalist ambitions that aimed at gaining more autonomy and control over Balochistan, and its resources. But with time, these ideologies have turned more radical. The struggle of some of these factions is now couched in ethnic terms with the non-Baloch residents and foreign nationals depicted as intruders or collaborators. This change of ideology has resulted in increased violence and targeting.
These groups [FAH and its proxies] are exploiting propaganda videos, speeches, and content online to recruit the disillusioned youth and to justify their actions. Use of social media sites has enabled them to propagate a message of resistance, while maintaing a false image of victimhood. The stance of, and narrative propagated by, FAH is paradoxical; they cry over marginalisation, and alleged-systemic injustices, meanwhile, also glorify violence against outsiders, labelling it as a means of liberation.
This increased radicalization of the insurgency is changing it into an ethnic conflict that is more unpredictable and hazardous than a political conflict.
Raising the Targets: State Symbols to Civilians and Foreigners
During the initial stages of the insurgency, the Baloch militant groups would primarily target the state infrastructure like gas pipelines, railway tracks, and security checkpoints. They targeted sites and infrastructure symbolising the presence of the Pakistani state in Balochistan, especially the military and paramilitary such as the Frontier Corps. These attacks were a way of expressing opposition to perceived occupation and exploitation.
Source: Combating Terrorism Centre
This practice has, however, changed over the past years. Militant forces have begun to target civilians, particularly non-Baloch people of Punjab and Sindh who either work or reside in Balochistan. A large number of these civilians are daily-wage earners, teachers, engineers, and labourers in government and development projects.
Even more troubling has been the fact that the Chinese nationals have become the target. Due to the opening of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Chinese engineers, construction workers, and officials have started visiting Balochistan regularly to work on the roads, ports, and energy projects.
Although these projects will improve the economy of Pakistan, they are labelled, by FAH to misguide the Baloch locals, as foreign exploitation machinery. The change of the focus to such high-profile targets indicates the intentional policy of expanding the conflict to the international level and exerting pressure on the Pakistani government through the disruption of its international relations.
The intention of such attacks is also to instil fear among the outsiders and deter investment and settlement in Balochistan. The attack on the Punjabis and Chinese laborers is representative of a new form of insurgency, predominantly targeting anybody not Baloch.
It reveals that the struggle is no longer only political autonomy or control of resources but has been turned into a territorial and ethnic conflict, characterised by rising intolerance and anti-State objectives. If the objectives of FAH, and their proxy BLA, are still not clear this video will clear any ambiguities.
Reasons for the Strategic Shift
The focus of FAH and militant groups on the state infrastructure, security forces, civilians, and foreign nationals is not a coincidence. Among the key drivers is the rising opposition to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The deliberately misguided Baloch individuals think that the CPEC projects like Gwadar port, highways, and energy infrastructure are constructed against the will of the local people and favor the central government and foreign firms over the people of Balochistan. Militants claim that such projects have caused militarization of the region, enhanced surveillance, and further economic marginalization of the local communities.
The other major incentive is to gain international recognition. The Baloch cause has been fighting to get international support over the years. Militants want to draw world attention to their cause by attacking Chinese workers or prominent infrastructure construction, such as the Karachi consulate.
Meanwhile, assaults on Punjabi and Sindhi settlers indicate a more profound ethnic conflict. A notion disseminated by FAH is that foreigners are altering the demographic ratio in the province. These fears are used by militants to promote violence as they view non-Baloch civilians as an instrument of state colonization in Balochistan.
Source: Dawn
FAH especially has declared in its public statements that it will not tolerate the presence of occupiers or state collaborators in Baloch land. This is an unhealthy transition of political opposition to ethnic-based violence, and it is more difficult to solve the conflict by negotiation.
Regional and geopolitical implications
The new strategies of FAH and its perpheral militant organizations, particularly the attack on the Chinese people and installations, are causing regional and geopolitical ripples. Among the most noticeable consequences is the increasing tension in the relations between Pakistan and China.
China has invested a lot of money into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is one of the flagship projects of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). But constant attacks by Chinese workers in Balochistan and other areas of Pakistan have brought serious security issues in Beijing.
China has reacted to it by asking that its citizens should be better guarded. Chinese officials even proposed stationing their own security personnel, for Chinese nationals in Balochistan, a move that leaves Islamabad on the edge of its sovereignty. Such tensions may hamper or make future cooperation unnecessarily slow or complex, as well as economic and diplomatic relations between the two nations.
Source: SCMP
The instability in Balochistan can soon be turned into an orchestrated and planned operation against the Baloch locals, by foreign intelligence services, particularly India, already present in the region. It is not a guess, but a fact backed by evidence that India through FAH and FAK are responsible for the instability in the province. Nevertheless, in the unstable local climate, even the mere suspicion of such intervention can cause more distrust and conflict, particularly between nuclear-armed neighbors, such as Pakistan and India.
Conclusion
The transition of a movement, meant to secure civil liberties of Baloch citizens, into an ethnic and anti-foreign violence campaign is not only a national security problem; it is a regional and global threat. It endangers the internal security of Pakistan, harms its relations with strong allies like China, and threatens to make the province of Balochistan a hotbed of regional conflicts.
