The CPEC Constitutional Mandate: A Debate on the Legal Protection of National Development Projects

Where the Debate Stands in 2025

As China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) enters its second decade, the question resurfacing in Islamabad’s policy circles is whether flagship national projects should receive explicit constitutional protections to ensure continuity across political cycles. The push comes amid officials’ repeated claims that the “early harvest” phase is largely complete and the agenda has shifted to industrialization and export-led growth through special economic zones (SEZs). In recent remarks marking Independence Day week, Chinese Ambassador Jiang Zaidong said roughly 90% of CPEC projects are complete, an assertion echoed by Pakistani and Chinese outlets focused on the corridor’s progress.

What Is Already Protected, and What Is Not

Pakistan already offers significant legal shelter to large investments through ordinary legislation, contracts and bilateral treaties. The Foreign Investment (Protection and Promotion) Act, passed in December 2022, enables Parliament to designate “qualified investments” for special protections; it has been used most visibly in the Reko Diq copper–gold project settlement. Separately, Pakistan’s 1989 bilateral investment treaty with China provides another layer of investor protection. But none of these measures elevate CPEC as a whole to constitutional status, the supreme law tier that would bind future governments and limit ordinary legislative reversals.

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The Case For Constitutional Protection

Proponents argue that Pakistan’s development strategy requires insulation of nationally strategic infrastructure from day-to-day politics. Their case hinges on three points. First, the macro stake, by official and academic tallies, CPEC has mobilized about $25.4 billion in direct Chinese investment over its first decade, adding thousands of megawatts to the grid and expanding the transmission backbone, outcomes repeatedly cited by Chinese and Pakistani sources. Second, Phase II is about jobs and exports; delays at SEZs erode credibility with investors. Third, security incidents targeting Chinese nationals have periodically disrupted momentum, raising pressure for predictability and continuity guarantees from the Pakistani state. A constitutional mandate, they argue, could lock in national commitment, coordinate the federation, and reduce the risk premium.

The Counter-Argument: Constitutional Overreach and Fiscal Risks

Opponents caution that constitutionalizing specific projects, or an entire program, would be a blunt instrument. Pakistan’s Constitution is designed to lay down foundational rights, institutional architecture and federal balances, not a project list. The Eighteenth Amendment’s devolution to provinces makes a one-size-fits-all federal mandate politically sensitive, especially where SEZs and resource corridors intersect provincial competencies. Moreover, Pakistan’s ongoing IMF program underscores a different priority, i.e, ensuring that investment facilitation does not create special carve-outs or guaranteed returns that distort the playing field. In a May 2025 staff report, authorities committed that the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC), the government’s fast-track one-window platform, will not grant regulatory or tax privileges outside the standard public investment management framework. A constitutional umbrella that effectively pre-commits fiscal concessions could collide with these undertakings.

Security, Federalism and the Courts

Security is the hardest variable. Attacks on Chinese engineers and CPEC-linked sites have forced Islamabad to promise tighter protection, and Beijing has pressed for stronger safeguards. Yet Pakistan bans armed foreign security, leaving the state to carry the burden. Elevating CPEC in the Constitution would not, by itself, neutralize militant threats; it would, however, raise the stakes of every disruption and potentially invite more constitutional litigation over security protocols and accountability. At the same time, research on CPEC’s first decade notes persistent tensions over federal–provincial equity and centralization of decision-making, issues that constitutional entrenchment might amplify unless the provinces are fully embedded in the mandate’s design.

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A Smarter Legal Path: Targeted, Transparent, Time-Bound

There is a middle course that strengthens continuity without turning the Constitution into a project registry. First, use ordinary law to codify clear, transparent criteria for designating “strategic national projects,” with automatic sunset reviews tied to delivery milestones, rather than indefinite immunities. Pakistan already has statutory architecture instruments like the 2022 investment protection act and the SEZ regime, through which Parliament can set rules that bind administrations but remain adaptable as conditions change. Second, deepen parliamentary and provincial oversight for SEZs to address long-running concerns over equitable distribution and local benefits; the Dhabeji SEZ’s 2025 completion timeline and similar industrial estates can become test cases for stronger accountability dashboards and open data. Third, ring-fence security through specialized forces and prosecutor-led case tracking, reporting regularly to a joint federal–provincial committee, rather than through constitutional clauses that courts would struggle to operationalize.

The Geopolitical Overlay

The corridor is evolving amid shifting external alignments. In February 2025, Pakistan and China agreed to deepen cooperation on rail upgrades, Gwadar development and mining, while encouraging more Chinese participation in offshore energy, signaling that Phase II remains a priority in Beijing. At the same time, Pakistan is seeking diversified investment, including from the United States and Gulf partners, under the SIFC umbrella. That balancing act argues for flexibility: constitutional rigidity could constrain Pakistan’s ability to recalibrate incentives and procurement models as global capital and supply chains move.

Concluding Reflections: Guard the Strategy, Not the Projects

CPEC’s core aim, modern infrastructure and competitive industry, deserves strong, credible protection. But the protection should be anchored in transparent statutes, enforceable contracts, provincial partnership and fiscal discipline, not in constitutional entrenchment of specific projects. Pakistan’s investment framework already offers tools to guarantee continuity and deter arbitrary policy swings, while IMF-aligned guardrails help keep incentives from morphing into liabilities. Elevating the entire corridor into the Constitution risks legal rigidity, federal friction and unintended fiscal commitments. The focus now should be on delivering Phase II outcomes, power reliability, export-centric SEZs, and secure corridors, under a rules-based regime that any government can inherit and implement. That, not a constitutional shortcut, is how Pakistan will persuade investors that its national development projects are protected for the long haul.