As Pakistan intensifies its counter-terrorism operations across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, the Fitna-al-Khwarij (FAK) faces an unprecedented internal crisis. According to intelligence briefings and security sources, majority of FAK’s current active fighters are Afghan nationals. This important demographic detail reflects: a steep decline in indigenous recruitment, and a growing dependence on foreign combatants, particularly from eastern Afghanistan.
The demographic shift exposes not only the ideological contradictions within the group’s regional alliances, but also its crippling logistical deficits and increasing reliance on external intelligence funding to remain operational.
An Ideological Crisis
Perhaps the most significant blow to FAK’s legitimacy came earlier this year when the Supreme Leader of the Afghan Taliban, Sheikh Hibatullah Akhundzada, reportedly issued a stern internal directive labelling attacks against Pakistan as “haram” which means religiously forbidden. Although this news was made public and even published in reputable news sources, both print and electronic. Moreover, the Afghan Taliban even confirmed that all groups in allegiance to, Sheikh Hibatullah, were given these directives, as well the security formations, and intelligence.
Nevertheless, the outlawed faction, FAK, has continued attacking Pakistan’s security forces, and innocent civilians through targeted activities in different provinces—despite clear cut prohibition by the Supreme Leader of Afghan Taliban. It proves the ideological divides between the Afghan Taliban and FAK are widening; and the latter is not concerned with the theological underpinnings, or fatwa, instead focused on conducting terrorist activities in Pakistan.
This declaration is a stark contradiction to the narrative historically used by FAK, which portrays Pakistan’s security forces as “apostate agents” — a rhetorical device long employed to justify its operations. The Afghan Taliban’s fatwa-style ruling effectively delegitimises FAK’s ideological foundations, particularly among Afghan fighters who now find themselves caught between obedience to their emir and loyalty to battlefield commanders operating in Pakistani territory.
This has led to growing friction between Afghan Taliban-aligned clergy and FAK leadership, and even small-scale defections or withdrawals in areas such as Kunar, Paktika, and Khost, where FAK maintains logistical safe zones and weapons caches. In some instances, Afghan fighters have reportedly returned to Taliban-controlled units following clerical pressure or tribal intervention.
Dwindling Manpower, Afghan Recruits, and Leadership Gaps
FAK’s dependence on Afghan nationals is not merely ideological, or ethnic exploitation, it is a tactical decision. The group’s Indigenous recruitment in KP and ex-FATA has dried up due to a combination of kinetic operations, community intelligence cells, and disillusionment among local youth, who now view FAK’s actions as foreign-driven and devoid of local legitimacy.
Faced with this vacuum, FAK leadership has turned to low-cost, high-risk recruitment in Afghan refugee camps and rural madrassas along the eastern Afghan belt. However, these recruits lack training, ideological discipline, or loyalty to FAK’s long-term sinister objectives. As a result, commanders face growing internal fragmentation, operational indiscipline, and loss of cohesion on the battlefield.
Additionally, several high-profile leaders have either been neutralised in drone strikes or are in hiding. This leadership vacuum has further accelerated internal discord, giving rise to factionalism and financial turmoil within the ranks of FAK.
Severe Weapon Shortages and Broken Supply Chains
FAK’s operational capacity has also been weakened by disrupted arms flows and ammunition shortages. Following enhanced border fencing, drone surveillance, and Pakistani coordination with regional actors, many of the weapons that once flowed freely through Afghanistan — including Soviet-era RPGs, M4s, and stolen NATO munitions — have become harder to access.
Even when arms are available, prices in black markets across Nimruz and Jalalabad have spiked, forcing FAK to ration firepower, delay planned operations, and cancel high-profile attacks due to lack of equipment. Several recent raids by Pakistani forces in North Waziristan and Dera Ismail Khan revealed home-made IEDs, outdated arms, and makeshift explosive kits — indicating the level of resource degradation within FAK cells.
Moreover, Afghan border authorities—under quiet pressure from central Taliban government—have curtailed the covert transport of weapons to FAK, thereby limiting its access to stockpiles once hidden in rural depots along the Durand Line.
Reliance on Indian Intelligence
With funding from narcotics and local extortion also drying up amid the active operations launched by Pakistan’s security forces, FAK has increasingly leaned on covert financial support allegedly from Indian intelligence networks, particularly RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) assets operating via third-party handlers in Afghanistan and Iran.
Several intelligence intercepts, presented by Pakistani officials at regional security forums, have cited triangulated payment trails routed through Herat, Kandahar, and Dubai, with financial proxies embedded in hawala networks and front businesses. This funding is used to maintain sleeper cells, pay foot soldiers, hire mercenaries and suicide bombers, and bribe facilitators inside border districts, and cities of Pakistan to conduct terrorist activities.
However, such reliance presents a long-term vulnerability. Indian strategic priorities are not aligned with FAK’s ideology, and funding is therefore transactional rather than ideological. As a result, delays or redirections in Indian covert financing — due to global scrutiny or shifting policy — could leave FAK with major operational shortfalls. This asymmetrical dependency also opens the group to potential manipulation, surveillance, or abandonment.
Collapse of a Parasitic Insurgency
The ongoing collapse of FAK’s indigenous base, combined with ideological discredit from Afghan Taliban authorities, dwindling weapons, decreasing financial reserves, and foreign dependency for survival—indicates towards the constantly deteriorating and decaying condition of FAK held together by desperation, not conviction.
The increasing presence of foreign fighters, particularly Afghans, does not signal strength — it reflects weakness. The group’s inability to mobilise locally, fund independently, or operate with strategic depth suggests that Pakistan’s multi-pronged pressure strategy is working, even if slowly. But full dismantlement will require further measures: regional intelligence coordination, disruption of funding lines, and strategic communication to discredit FAK’s religious pretensions among both Pakistani and Afghan populations.
In the end, FAK may not be militarily defeated in a single blow, but it is being ideologically and financially eroded, piece by piece.
