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by | Jul 22, 2025

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From the Middle East: Militancy’s Echo in Pakistan’s Terrorism

Jul 22, 2025 | Terrorism









Terrorism has been one of the greatest security threats in Pakistan, and its causes have not only been internal but also related to what is going on in the region. In Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East, political transitions, armed violence, and power struggles directly influence the character, frequency, and severity of terrorist threats in Pakistan. In 2021, following the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, the Fitna-al-Khawarij (FAK) began to attack Pakistan with increased frequency, after establishing safe havens on Afghan soil.

Likewise, the tension with Iran and the expanding Sunni-Shia divide, due in part to Saudi-Iran rivalry, has raised sectarian violence within Pakistan. In the meantime, the ideologies of extremism and repatriated veterans of war conflicts in Syria and Iraq still influence local terrorist networks. The regional dynamics–geopolitical changes in particularly in Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East–in amalgamation contribute to the changing nature of terrorism in Pakistan and how the war on militancy is becoming more complicated.

The Afghan Factor: The Post 2021 Taliban Rule and Its Spillover Effects

The re-emergence of the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan in August 2021 posed a serious security threat to Pakistan. In an early move, Pakistan welcomed the Taliban regime, which was expected to put the anti-Pakistan elements, such as the Fitna-al-Khawarij (FAK), in check, instead the opposite happened. The FAK has had an opportunity to reorganize its leadership and expand its operations since the Taliban takeover, being able to act with increased impunty from Afghan soil. Terrorist attacks grew by more than 70 percent, with the FAK being the culprit behind the majority of them.

The Taliban government in Kabul has declined to take serious action against the FAK, saying that it is an internal affair of Pakistan. In addition to it, the Taliban does not consider FAK fighters to be enemies but rather ideological allies, and on most occasions, the group has had safe havens in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, such as Kunar and Nangarhar. The Taliban has not been able to push or curb the FAK leadership in Afghanistan despite repeated requests by Pakistan. This has only deteriorated the relationship between Islamabad and Kabul, and the skirmishes on the border have risen at different checkpoints along the Durand Line.

Another threat is the increased ISIS-K presence in Afghanistan. ISIS-K is not only opposing the Taliban rule but also conducting fatal attacks in Pakistan, particularly against Shia communities and security agencies. The group has a transnational ideology and it tries to cause sectarian mayhem in Pakistan through bombing mosques, shrines, and religious congregations.

News Article | The Islamic State in Afghanistan: A Jihadist Threat in Retreat?

Source: Crisis Group

Instability in Afghanistan has resulted in cross-border infiltration. The militants traverse the porous border with much ease, despite the fact Pakistan has been constructing a border fence and 97 percent has been completed. Nevertheless, the militants still manage to infiltrate through the uncharted routes and the facilitation of local agents. Furthermore, the presence of Afghan refugees and uncontrolled trade across the border also complicates the process of security checks, and there are fears that extremist forces can infiltrate the stream of civilians.

Iran Pakistan Relations: Proxy and Sectarian Faultlines

Pakistan and Iran have a long and generally strained border, particularly in the Balochistan province, where both nations have fought to contain militant groups functioning from across the border. Iran has repeatedly blamed Pakistan for not preventing anti-Iran groups, such as Jaish al-Adl, operating from Pakistani soil and attacking the Iranian Sistan-Balochistan province. In the same manner, Pakistan accuses Iran of harboring or ignoring the actions of the sectarian elements that endanger the internal peace of Pakistan, such as suspected funding of Shia armed groups.

The tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East further entrenched sectarian violence in Pakistan, particularly the violence against Shia-Muslims. These terrorist-activities are frequently carried out by proxy forces conequently, the Sunni-Shia sectarian environment in Pakistan also exacerbates. Anti-Shia Sunni extremist groups have traditionally been financially and ideologically supported by stakeholders in the Gulf. Iran, on the other hand, has continued to have links with certain Shia groups in Pakistan which has created concerns regarding the recurrence of sectarian reprisal.

In recent years, Pakistan has been experiencing an increase in sectarian killings, with most of them being connected with ideological conflicts between pro-Saudi and pro-Iranian factions. These groups in other instances also attack security forces, journalists, and even one another, making internal stability even more problematic.

Relations between Iran and Pakistan reached their tenuous-peak in January 2024 when both sides conducted cross-border strikes, targeting militant safe-havens and bases. Even though both governments subsequently agreed to de-escalate and normalize diplomatic relations, the incident demonstrated how unstable the relationship is and how easily geopolitical differences can escalate into violence. This kind of tension not only impacts the security of the borders but also empowers militant groups to exploit the disunity in the coordination between the two states.

Middle East Turbulence and Its Ideological Impact

The continued upheavals in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, influence not only the immediate neighbours, but have also contributed significantly to the development of extremist ideologies in Pakistan. Hundreds of Pakistani nationals are said to have traveled to Iraq and Syria during the best years of ISIS (2014-2018) to join the movement and support its cause. Most of them had been radicalized through online propaganda and radical religious groups, disseminating extremist discourse. Those ideologically incarcertated individuals—having battle experience, and extremist ideals—after returning to Pakistan pose significant security challenges.

Organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda promote world jihadist ideologies that are not limited to national borders. Such ideologies are supported by the radicalized people in Pakistan, particularly in regions that suffer due to bad governance, sectarianism, and tribal differences.

Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State

Source: Crisis Group

The Khorasan branch of ISIS (ISIS-K) has established contacts with local elements and recruits in Pakistan, aiming to create havoc and terror in the country, including among Shias, Sufis, and even among the Sunni themselves. ISIS-K was directly connected to such attacks as the bombing of Shia mosques in Peshawar and Hangu. Al-Jazeera, a famous and credible news outlet, further reported:

Iftikhar Firdous, from the Khorasan Diary, attributes the Mastung attack to the violent ideology of ISIS, specifically its regional branches, ISKP and ISPP. These groups often target public gatherings to maximize casualties. Firdous notes that ISPP has a strong presence in Mastung and frequently attacks civilians, regardless of their religion, because their ideology and religious rulings (fatwas) encourage such attacks. Abdul Sayed, another researcher, also suspects ISPP in the Mastung attack, while noting ISKP’s stronger presence in areas near Hangu district. ISKP previously claimed responsibility for a deadly bombing in Bajaur in July.

The Middle East not only determines ideology but also controls the financial flows. Some of the outlawed extremist groups in Pakistan have been funded by thousands of individual donors present the Gulf States. Such money is usually moved using informal channels such as hawala, and thus it is hard to track it. This kind of external funding bolsters the establishment of sleeper cells, propaganda networks, and militant training centers in Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the foreign policy in Pakistan has been seeking a fine balance between powers in the Middle East, primarily Saudi Arabia and Iran. Although Saudi Arabia has been offering economic support and energy resources, Iran has religious and strategic interests, particularly with the Shia community in Pakistan. But this balancing has not always been in the interest of Pakistan. Being too close to any side may trigger reprisals from the either side, as witnessed when Pakistan did not deploy troops to Yemen in 2015, a move that angered Saudi Arabia and made Iran happy.

Geopolitical Rivalries and Pakistan as a Proxy Battlefield

The country of Pakistan has been struggling between the larger powers of the region and the world. Pakistan served as a frontline partner of the United States during the Cold War against the Soviet influence in Afghanistan—by funding and training the Afghan Mujahideen. Resultantly, a strong jihadist network was established in Pakistan’s tribal regions and madrassas.

Once Soviet troops left, most of these warriors and their ideologies did not vanish; instead, they became self-centered. Therefore, they [mujhadeens turned into militants] directed their energies to other regional wars, such as Kashmir or sectarian conflicts, which preconditioned the modern militancy. Pakistan is still reeling with the aftermath of that period, with militant groups that were created during that period still operating under new names, such as FAK or ISIS-K.

In recent years, new geopolitical rivalries have taken place, which also affect the internal security of Pakistan. Some radical groups have been propagating the India-Afghanistan-Israel story to create anti-state feelings and attract fighters in Pakistan. Militant groups argue that these nations are collaborating to destabilize Pakistan, a perception that, though unconfirmed to a large extent, is employed to justify violence.

In addition, the regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia still influence the sectarian groups and are using Pakistan as the proxy battlefield. This competition is the source of both Sunni and Shia extremism, with funding, ideology, and logistical support coming from across-borders by both stakeholders. The complex regional landscape perfectly explains how Pakistan is getting transformed into a conflict zone of greater power struggles.

Conclusion

The terrorism situation in Pakistan does not exist in a vacuum: it is a result of an regional instability in which the politics of Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East, in general, overlap with local fault lines. The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the sectarian proxy wars with Iran, and the ideological expansion of the so-called jihadist movements in the Middle East have all been factors that have made the security situation more dangerous and complicated.

Although Pakistan has made significant steps in combating terrorism domestically, it cannot achieve much without effective regional collaboration, a steadfast diplomatic approach, and a more ideological de-radicalization. Unless Pakistan is no longer used as a playground of proxy wars and cross-border extremist interests, its war against terrorism will never be full and proactive. The only solution is a long-term, regionally integrated approach based on dialogue, security coordination, and ideological resilience.