For over a decade, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has stood as the flagship of Pakistan’s strategic partnership with China — a pillar of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and a symbol of Islamabad’s “all-weather friendship” with its most important geopolitical ally. But behind the warm rhetoric of “iron brothers” and “deeper than the oceans” ties, the partnership is now under unprecedented strain.
A sharp rise in targeted attacks on Chinese nationals, including a devastating suicide bombing in March 2024 that killed seven Chinese engineers near Bisham, has catalysed a serious reassessment in Beijing. The incident marked the deadliest assault on Chinese citizens in Pakistan since the 2021 Dasu attack and has pushed China to demand an overhaul of security protocols, including the creation of a Joint Security Mechanism (JSM) that would give Beijing greater operational input into Pakistan’s internal security arrangements related to CPEC.
Mounting Chinese Frustrations: A Crisis of Confidence
While Chinese investment in CPEC has crossed $60 billion, returns — both strategic and financial — have been uneven. Projects have faced delays, bureaucratic red tape, financial mismanagement, and now existential threats to personnel and infrastructure. What began as a bold geoeconomic venture has increasingly become a security liability in the eyes of Beijing.
China’s frustration is visible in multiple ways:
- State media and think tanks have become more critical, questioning Pakistan’s ability to provide “guaranteed security” for Chinese workers.
- Diplomatic statements now include direct references to Pakistan’s failure to act decisively against militant groups threatening Chinese interests, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
- Chinese firms operating in Gwadar and Kohistan have scaled back operations, demanding greater risk premiums and some even relocating their base staff to Islamabad.
The Security Fault Line: Militancy, Nationalism, and Chinese Targets
A major source of strain is the persistence of asymmetric threats, primarily from FAH (Fitna al-Hindustan) and remnants of FAK (Fitna al-Khwarij) factions operating in the north. These groups view CPEC as an instrument of economic colonisation and target Chinese nationals to generate headlines, deter investment, and embarrass the Pakistani state.
Security officials concede that Chinese personnel are now preferred targets due to the global visibility of such attacks. The March 2024 Bisham suicide bombing was a chilling reminder of the sophistication and intent of these networks — a vehicle packed with explosives rammed into a convoy despite a multilayered security escort.
While Pakistan has raised new security battalions — including the Special Security Division (SSD) and Frontier Corps reinforcements — recent attacks indicate intelligence gaps, poor coordination, and local facilitation remain unresolved.
Joint Security Mechanism: A Diplomatic Dilemma
In response to the rising death toll, China has pressed for a Joint Security Mechanism, demanding:
- Joint command centres for key CPEC zones, staffed with Chinese liaison officers.
- Greater intelligence-sharing privileges for Chinese agencies operating in Pakistan.
- Access to surveillance systems, infrastructure perimeters, and local policing strategies in high-risk areas.
- Periodic review panels are chaired jointly by Chinese and Pakistani security officials.
While Islamabad has expressed willingness in principle, the proposal has generated considerable pushback from military, intelligence, and political circles — who see it as a sovereignty red line. Critics argue that while cooperation is necessary, any move that suggests foreign involvement in internal policing would be politically explosive and could set an unsustainable precedent.
Moreover, there are concerns that expanding China’s security footprint could provoke further militancy, feeding into narratives of external domination, especially in regions like Balochistan, where separatist sentiment is already inflamed.
Economic Implications: A Corridor in Crisis
Beyond the human cost, the security volatility around CPEC is threatening the long-term viability of key economic projects:
- Gwadar Port remains underutilised, with frequent protests, insurgent attacks, and a lack of basic urban services.
- The ML-1 railway project, a critical upgrade to Pakistan’s logistics infrastructure, has faced delays due to Chinese concerns over repayment guarantees and workforce protection.
- Special Economic Zones (SEZs) planned in Faisalabad, Rashakai, and Dhabeji are struggling to attract investors amid worsening security perceptions.
China’s shift toward “risk recalibration” is evident — it has slowed down fresh capital commitments, paused certain concessional loan tranches, and is increasingly restructuring existing debt on stricter terms.
The Strategic Costs: A Friendship Tested
While both sides insist that the partnership remains “stronger than ever”, there is a growing perception that the Pakistan-China alliance is becoming increasingly transactional. Beijing’s zero-tolerance approach to security and Islamabad’s limited enforcement capacity are on a collision course.
For Pakistan, this tension emerges at a particularly delicate time:
- Relations with the U.S. are volatile under Trump’s presidency.
- The IMF and Gulf financial backers are demanding reforms.
- Domestic political instability continues to undermine governance and policy continuity.
If China begins to rethink the strategic reliability of Pakistan, the consequences could include:
- Diversion of future BRI projects to alternative routes via Central Asia.
- Greater Chinese dependence on bilateral military deals rather than integrated economic partnerships.
- Reduced diplomatic backing at international forums where China has historically shielded Pakistan (e.g., FATF, UN Security Council).
Managing Expectations in a Complicated Friendship
CPEC, once hailed as a “game-changer”, now sits at the crossroads of opportunity and risk. The deaths of Chinese workers in 2024 were not just a humanitarian tragedy — they marked a turning point in the psychology of the China-Pakistan partnership.
Islamabad must now walk a diplomatic tightrope: reassure China of its commitment to CPEC without surrendering sovereignty while also containing militancy without inflaming local resistance. That requires more than battalions and barbed wire — it demands governance reform, intelligence overhaul, political consensus, and transparency in dealings with Beijing.
The strength of Pakistan’s most vital alliance will now be measured not by metaphors but by how both sides adapt to the realities of insecurity, economic fatigue, and strategic distrust.
