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The Kohat Attack: The TTP, TTA, Al Qaeda Nexus

Sep 23, 2026 | Terrorism









Kohat was hit on September 18, 2026, when a suicide bomber targeted a mosque during the Friday Prayers. The gunmen accompanying the terrorist stormed the nearby police facility and held it for twenty hours. In this terror attack, 31 innocent people lost their lives, including 16 police personnel, with multiple injured. The eight terrorists were neutralized eventually. On September 22, 2026, Pakistan’s Armed Forces struck back. As per the information from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 37 terrorists were neutralized in ground operations around Kohat, Hangu, and Thal. Airstrikes were carried out to target their hideouts inside Afghanistan. Kohat is not an isolated incident; it is an expression of the evolving militant architecture. Pakistan Government officials, UN Monitors, and Analysts have described it as a nexus between the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Afghan Taliban, and Al Qaeda.

Terrorist Sanctuaries

United Nations Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team has documented this relationship. The 38th Report, issued in August 2026, found that Afghanistan continues to allow TTP, Al-Qaeda, and even Islamic State-Khorasan to operate from its soil. Moreover, the Report found that the current Afghan regime has been providing training, funding, and logistical aid to these militant groups to conduct terror activities across Pakistan’s border.

The 36th Report from the UNSC stated that “TTP continued to receive substantial logistical and operational support from the de facto authorities” in Kabul. Afghanistan is also sheltering at least 6000 fighters on its soil. Alarmingly, Al-Qaeda and TTP have effectively blended together through the former’s regional affiliate in the Indian Subcontinent. They maintain a low-visibility presence across Afghan provinces and provide TTP with financial, logistical, and weaponry support, and training while keeping the ideological affinity.

Michael Semple—a former EU representative in Afghanistan who negotiated with the Taliban—informed Al Jazeera that the sophistication of the attack in Kohat suggests that it could not be materialized without proper planning, logistics, and training. Therefore, it would not be wrong to assume that the Afghan Taliban have been providing a sanctuary to both Al-Qaeda and different factions of the TTP.  Kabul, however, denies hosting any terrorist groups, whereas the UN Monitoring Team has repeatedly called this denial “not credible.”

Domestic Gaps

The terrorists are expected to attack Pakistan; nevertheless, the gap in domestic policies undermines the efforts of the Security Forces to eradicate the threat of terrorism. Cross-border strikes address the problem of sanctuaries in Afghanistan; however, they are by no means a substitute for the National Action Plan’s unmet promises.

National Action Plan (NAP) was introduced in 2014 after the tragic incident in the Army Public School. Its core objectives were to dismantle the seminary financing networks, curb hate speech, shut down proscribed groups operating under new names, and strengthen prosecutions. These are the non-kinetic measures that were to be undertaken by the respective Provincial Governments, primarily of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan—the two most prone provinces to terrorism.

Pakistan’s own institutions have termed the progress on NAP as non-satisfactory. 26,000 plus seminaries are to date functioning without the fulfillment of registration and audit requirements. The Provincial Governments remain fearful of confronting the street power of these seminary networks.

The Judicial data also narrates a similar tale. Thousands of terrorism suspects have either been acquitted or are roaming free on bail; there have been only a handful of executions. These efforts collectively are inadequate to deter local terrorist facilitation or to break the backbone of the terrorist networks operating discreetly in Pakistan behind the veil of Madrassahs.

Political will is the most prominent thing lacking in this context. Due to coalition politics, short-term crises, and other reasons, the governments of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan have failed to close the gaps.

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Recommendations

The efforts to eradicate terrorism must be multifaceted. Islamabad’s response has to focus on both fronts at once.

Kinetic Measures

Kinetic operations, specifically precision, intelligence-based operations like the recent Kohat-Hangu-Thal clearance, should be continued; however, they should be targeted rather than indiscriminate to ensure no civilian casualties occur. Otherwise, it would create more sympathy among the locals for the militants rather than eroding it.

Effective border management, such as fencing, advanced surveillance technology, manned checkpoints, and drone flights for reconnaissance and targeting of the insurgents, should be ensured across the Durand Line.

Constant surveillance would create the fear of elimination among the infiltrating terrorists rather than periodic strikes. Intelligence-sharing and fusion between military, police, and civilian agencies is imperative, and it should move faster than the militants attempting to exploit the gaps between them.

Non-Kinetic Measures

The following non-kinetic measures are imperative to eradicate the menace of terrorism:

  • Seminary registration and financial audits must be enforced, and a proactive role should be played by the provincial governments to this effect.
  • Terrorists should be prosecuted faster, and it must be ensured that they do not exploit the legal loopholes that would buy their freedom.  
  • Witnesses and Judges should be provided protection to ensure they do not relent from the cause of holding the terrorists accountable.
  • Forensic capacities should be advanced to secure convictions rather than acquittals.
  • Counter-Radicalisation Programs should be initiated for returnees and at-risk youth in the regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.
  • Tribal districts should be granted the same sustained funding, not the leftover budget, to ensure their grievances are met.
  • Diplomatically, Pakistan needs to keep building the regional consensus to pressurize Kabul with something more than bilateral complaints. The frustration with Kabul’s behavior is evident in recent UN reporting, statements from China, Iran and Central Asian states.

Conclusion

The airstrikes on Kunar or Khost can detrimentally affect the capacity of the terrorists but only temporarily. The kinetic measures cannot close the terror-financing loopholes or convict facilitators in courtrooms. Islamabad has made it evident that it can effectively target the terrorist sanctuaries; nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the same vigor and consistency can be applied to the slower, politically uncomfortable work at home. These factors will cumulatively determine whether Kohat becomes a turning point or another in the long list of terror wounds inflicted on Pakistan.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Q1. What is the National Action Plan?

National Action Plan (NAP) was introduced in 2014 after the tragic incident in the Army Public School. Its core objectives were to dismantle the seminary financing networks, curb hate speech, shut down proscribed groups operating under new names, and strengthen prosecutions.

Q2. What are the findings of the United Nations Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team 38th Report?

United Nations Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team has documented this relationship. The 38th Report, issued in August 2026, found that Afghanistan continues to allow TTP, Al-Qaeda, and even Islamic State-Khorasan to operate from its soil. Moreover, the Report found that the current Afghan regime has been providing training, funding, and logistical aid to these militant groups to conduct terror activities across Pakistan’s border.

Q3. Which terrorist organizations are working together?

Afghanistan continues to allow TTP, Al-Qaeda, and Islamic State-Khorasan to operate from its soil. The current Afghan regime has been providing training, funding, and logistical aid to these militant groups.